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1Si, PO! FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTE
RESOLUTION DOES HAVE A PLACE IN
TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE AMERICAS:
A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT CHAPTER 10
OF THE UNITED STATES-CHILE FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT
INTRODUCTION
On June 6, 2003, the United States and Chile signed a Free
Trade Agreement (U.S.-Chile FTA), after three years of formal
negotiations.' The U.S.-Chile FTA comes some nine years after
1. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003, at the official website for the
United States Trade Representative, http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/Chile/text/ (last
visited October 31, 2003) [hereinafter U.S.-Chile FTA]; see also the official website of
the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, at http://www.direcon.cl (last visited
June 6, 2003) [hereinafter Direcon]. There were fourteen rounds of negotiations,
beginning in December 1999 and concluding in December 2002.
The U.S.-Chile FTA was signed in Miami, Florida after several months of tension
between President George W. Bush and President Ricardo Lagos, resulting from
Chile's refusal to back a second U.S.-proposed resolution in the United Nations
Security Council supporting military action against Iraq. See CNNenEspafiol.com,
"Estados Unidos y Chile firman tratado de libre comercio," at http://edition.cnn.com
(last visited June 6, 2003) [hereinafter CNN Chile]; La Naci6n, Carolina Miranda,
"Alvear firma el pacto commercial ms "soniado" del gobierno de Lagos," at http://
www.lanacion.cl (last visited June 6, 2003) [hereinafter La Naci6n TLC]; El Diario,
"Definitivo: TLC con Estados Unidos se firma el 6 de junio," at http://www.eldiario.cl
(last visited May 28, 2003); La Tercera, M. Alam & M. Chapochnick, "Chile y EE.UU.
ponen fin a incertidumbre y anuncian firma de TLC, May 28, 2003, No. 19.342
[hereinafter La Tercera TLCI (explaining that President Lagos stood firm on Chile's
historic pacifist stance to international military conflict).
The leaders of both countries were not present for the signing; rather, U.S. Trade
Representative Robert Zoellick and Chilean Minister of Foreign Relations Soledad
Alvear completed the formalities. See CNN Chile; El Mercurio, Nelly Yfiiez, "Sin los
Presidentes se firmard el TLC con EE.UU," at http://elmercurio.cl (last visited May
28, 2003) (signaling that Chile's support of the United States in the United Nations to
lift sanctions on Iraq after the coalition victory was politically conducive to finalizing
the U.S.-Chile FTA).
Despite the tension resulting from disagreement over the recent war with Iraq,
both countries expressed a positive outlook and a commitment to the U.S.-Chile FTA.
See CNN Chile. Chile expects its GDP to increase by one percent each year just from
new commerce resulting from the U.S.-Chile FTA, and expects its exports to the
United States to increase by forty percent in a very short time. Chile also expects its
economy to double in size by 2014 as a result of the treaty. See La Tercera TLC; La
Nacion TLC (discussing in more detail the various economic prospects for Chile as a
result of the U.S.-Chile FTA).
In July of 2003 both the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate
approved the U.S.-Chile FTA, and on September 3, 2003, President George W. Bush
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discussion of Chile's entry into the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) was suspended.2 This latest development in
the rubric of international trade in the Americas represents a his-
toric step for both the United States and Chile. It is the first trade
agreement signed between the United States and a South Ameri-
can country. It is also the second agreement of its kind signed
between the United States and a developing country in the Ameri-
cas, and as such it represents a progressive step for both econo-
mies, especially so for Chile.' Moreover, it represents a forward
stride toward the realization of a Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA).4
signed the agreement. See FAS Online, at http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/Chile/us-Chile.
html (last visited Sept. 29, 2003). On October 22, 2003, the Chilean Congress
officially approved the U.S.-Chile FTA. See Gobierno de Chile, Ministerio de
Relaciones Exteriores, Direccion General de Relaciones Economicas Internacionales,
"Comision Especial de la Camara de Diputados Aprobo Tratado de Libre Comercio con
EE.UU," at http://www.minrel.cl/prensa/Comunicados2003/10-09-03(2).htm (last
visited Oct. 27, 2003). The agreement entered into force on January 1, 2004.
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 107
Stat. 2057, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. There was much
discussion initially that Chile would become a founding member of NAFTA. See
NAFTA: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 28 (Ralph H. Folsom, Michael Wallace
Gordon, & David Lopez eds., 2000) [hereinafter NAFTA Coursebook]. However, after
five meetings, Chile suspended talks regarding its accession, waiting for the U.S.
Congress to approve fast-track negotiating authority for U.S. President Bill Clinton,
which never happened. In subsequent years, Chile entered into separate free trade
agreements with Canada and Mexico. See infra Part II.
3. The first trade agreement was between the United States and Mexico with
NAFTA. See NAFTA, supra note 2. Most recently, the United States signed the
Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) with Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. See the official website for the United States
Trade Representative, [hereinafter USTR Websitel at http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/
Cafta/text/preamble.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2004). Although outside the scope of this
article, that agreement contains provisions for investor-state foreign investment
dispute resolution very similar to those found in the U.S.-Chile FTA.
4. In December of 1994, thirty-four democratic countries met in Miami, Florida
at the Summit of the Americas, with the goal of fashioning the FTAA. See official
website of the FTAA, at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/View-e.asp (last visited Aug. 15,
2003) [hereinafter FTAA Website] and Summit of the Americas, at http:/www.
summit-americas.org (last visited Feb. 23, 2003) [hereinafter Summit of Americas
Website]. See also PATRICE FRANKO, THE PUZZLE OF LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 241 (1999). "The idea behind the FTAA... is the consolidation of the
nearly twenty-five free trade pacts already operating in a region of nearly 800 million
inhabitants.". Notably,
The Summit of the Americas process ... is an institutionalized set
of meetings at the highest level of government decision-making in
the Western Hemisphere. The purpose of the meetings . . . is to
discuss common issues and seek solutions to problems shared by all
the countries in the Americas, be they economic, social, military or
political in nature.
Since the Miami Summit, major summits have taken place in San Jose (1996),
2004] US-CHILE FREE TRADE 629
Like NAFTA, the U.S.-Chile FTA takes into account the
importance of foreign investment along side free trade in realizing
goals of economic harmonization and progress. The ability to
attract foreign investment is critical to economic growth, just as
trade is, especially for developing countries. Similarly as with
trade, foreign investment demands the establishment of a unique
set of rules. In order to promote investment, there must be clear
guidelines regarding foreign investors' rights and the protection of
such rights. A structured, predictable legal framework for foreign
investment dispute resolution is an integral part of the promotion
of foreign investment. Modeled after NAFTA Chapter 11, Chapter
10 of the U.S.-Chile FTA seeks to accomplish this goal by allowing
for the direct participation of private investors in international
dispute resolution. Chapter 10 grants investors from both coun-
tries direct access to international arbitration to resolve a dispute
arising out of a Party's alleged breach of the provisions in Section
A of the chapter.
NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute resolution has been a source of
debate in recent years, attracting criticism from academics and
public interest groups.' The arguments against investor-state dis-
Santiago (1998) and Quebec City (2001). See also Richard L. Bernal, Free Trade
Areas: The Challenge and Promise of Fair vs. Free Trade, 27 LAw AND POLICY IN INT'L
Bus. 945 (1996), stating that the FTAA would serve as an enormous regional trade
agreement, creating "a market of... [over] 719 million people and could expand trade
within the hemisphere to unprecedented levels." On November 20, 2003, FTAA
negotiating countries met in Miami, Florida and reiterated their commitment to
conclude negotiations by early January 2005. See FTAA Website, supra note 1. The
Third Draft of the Consolidated Text of the FTAA is available on the FTAA Website.
Through the Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, negotiating states have
agreed to make decisions on a consensus basis, to ensure that the decision-making
process is transparent, to follow WTO-based guidelines, to take into account the needs
of less-developed countries, and to complete negotiations for the FTAA by 2005. See
Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, 34 I.L.M. 808 (1995) [hereinafter FTAA
Declaration]. See also FTAA Website, supra note 1. The Declaration also expresses
the negotiating states' commitment to "build on existing subregional and bilateral
agreements in order to broaden and deepen hemispheric integration and to bring
agreements together." See FTAA Declaration, at 811. For detailed discussions on the
FTAA and economic integration, see Frank J. Garcia, "Americas Agreements"--An
Interim Stage in Building the Free Trade Area of the Americas, 35 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 63 (1997) [hereinafter Garcia, Americas Agreement]; Frank J. Garcia,
New Frontiers in International Trade: Decisionmaking and Dispute Resolution in the
Free Trade Area of the Americas: An Essay in Trade Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L.
357 (1997) [hereinafter Garcia, New Frontiers]; David Lopez, Dispute Resolution
under a Free Trade Area of the Americas, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 597 (1997).
5. See Charles H. Brower II, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The Empire
Strikes Back, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 43, 44 (2001) (noting that Chapter 11 "has
become a lightning rod for opponents of globalization and the intrusion of
international law into domestic affairs.").
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pute resolution vary, but in general critics have claimed that it is
a threat to national sovereignty and an affront to democratic gov-
ernance.6 The text of Chapter 10 attempts to address some of the
major concerns voiced about NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute resolu-
tion by incorporating provisions aimed at establishing a more
transparent dispute resolution process. Notably, over the last few
years, clarifications of NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute resolution
issued by the Parties and the conduct of Chapter 11 arbitrations
have demonstrated a commitment on behalf of the Parties to a
more transparent dispute resolution process. However, Chapter
10 goes a step further by explicitly incorporating new provisions in
the text.
Whether Chapter 10 dispute resolution will generate the
same criticisms as NAFTA Chapter 11, of course, remains to be
6. For discussion of the NAFTA Chapter 11 debate, see Brower II, supra note 5;
Scott R. Jablonski, Comment, NAFTA Chapter 11 Dispute Resolution and Mexico: A
Healthy Mix of International Law, Economics and Politics, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y (forthcoming 2004) (copy on file with the author); Ray C. Jones, NAFTA
Chapter 11 Investor-to-State Dispute Resolution: A Shield to Be Embraced or a Sword
to Be Feared?, 2002 B.Y.U.L. REV. 527, 545-46 (2002); Frederick M. Abbott, The
Political Economy of NAFTA Chapter Eleven: Equality Before the Law and the
Boundaries of North American Integration, 23 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 303,
308 (2002); Daniel M. Price, NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-State Dispute Settlement:
Frankenstein or Safety Valve?, 26 CAN .-U.S. L.J. 1, 8 (2001); Ian Laird, NAFTA
Chapter 11 Meets Chicken Little, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 223, 226 (2001); Fulvio Fracassi,
Confidentiality and NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitrations, 2 CHI. J. INTL L. 213, 217
(2001); Maximo Romero Jimenez, Considerations of NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 243, 250 (2001); Justin Byrne, NAFTA Dispute Resolution: Implementing
True Rule-Based Diplomacy Through Direct Access, TEx. INT'L LJ. 415, 434 (2000);
Donald S. Macdonald, Chapter 11 of NAFTA: What are the Implications for
Sovereignty, 24 Can.-U.S. L.J. 281 (1998); Jose E. Alvarez, Critical Theory and the
North American Free Trade Agreement's Chapter Eleven, 28 U. MiAmI INTER-AM. L.
REV. 303 (1996); Public Citizen, "NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-to-State Cases:
Bankrupting Democracy," available at http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.
cfm?ID=7076 (last visited Aug. 15, 2003); "Bill Moyers Reports: Trading Democracy,"
February 5, 2002, 10:00pm (ET), PBS, transcript available at http://www.citizen.org/
tradeNAFTA/CHllarticles.cfm?ID=6687 (last visited Aug. 15, 2003); "Viendo El
Futuro: Un documento preparado por la Comisi6n de Asuntos Sociales (CCCB-CECC)
en vistas a la conferenica Humanizando la Economia Global, Presentada en La
Universidad de Cat6lica de Am4rica, Washington, D.C., Enero 28 al 30, 2002,
available at http://www.citizen.org (last visited Aug. 15, 2003).
In general, critics have argued that NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute resolution is
flawed in that it creates a potential for frivolous litigation and disproportionate
compensation for investors, it lacks an appellate review process, it promotes
resolution of disputes through "secret" tribunals, it prevents legitimate regulation by
governments for the public health and the environment, and it neglects notions of
equality and sustainable development. See Jablonski (summarizing and analyzing
the arguments for and against NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute resolution). See also infra
Part III.B.2.
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seen. At this stage, however, the important issues are how and to
what extent the Chapter 10 text differs from or expands upon dis-
pute resolution under NAFTA Chapter 11, as it represents an
important development in the evolution of international dispute
resolution in the Americas. The purpose of this article is thus to
analyze the Chapter 10 dispute resolution process, using the
NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute resolution process as a basis for
comparison.
Part II of this article first provides some background on for-
eign investment and the laws pertaining thereto in Chile, provid-
ing a brief summary of the investment climate in Chile. Chile's
economic status and progressive investment laws relative to other
Latin American countries has enabled it to enter into such a
trade/investment agreement with the United States. It is an
example to the rest of Latin America of how open economic policy
and predictable legal rules can enhance growth and the opportu-
nity for a better future. Further, it is another example of how
international law regarding investment has a place in Latin
America.
Part III analyzes the text of Chapter 10 of the U.S.-Chile
FTA. It first addresses its major substantive provisions, com-
menting on the rationale behind the open investment provisions
as well as the reasons for some exceptions to the open regime.
Part III then discusses the investor-state dispute resolution pro-
cess in detail, article by article, using NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute
resolution as a basis for comparison. Inferences are made
throughout with respect to potential praise and criticism of the
Chapter 10 dispute resolution framework given the present
debate on NAFTA Chapter 11, and a summary of the new develop-
ments found in Chapter 10 dispute resolution is provided. At
base, investor-state dispute resolution in the U.S.-Chile FTA is an
important development in the evolution of international dispute
resolution in the Americas.
CHILE AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT: AN EXAMPLE FOR
LATIN AMERICA
Chile has emerged as a symbol for growth in Latin America.
Its commitment to open economic policy and strong legal struc-
tures over the last twenty years, and its commitment to democ-
racy over the last ten years, has enabled it to experience relatively
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consistent macroeconomic success.7 In the last ten years, Chile
has also entered into numerous bilateral and multilateral eco-
nomic agreements to secure its path toward economic advance-
ment. Chile continues to enjoy an increasing inflow of foreign
7. Chile follows a policy of economic liberalization, with a commitment to free
markets. See Foreign Investment Committee of the State of Chile, at http:/www.
foreigninvestment.cl (last visited June 3, 2003) [hereinafter Foreign Investment
Committee]. It maintains a flexible exchange rate policy, and the Central Bank is
committed to a policy of low inflation. See Banco Central de Chile, at http://www.
bcentral.cl. (last visited June 3, 2003) [hereinafter Banco Central]. According to the
Foreign Investment Committee, since 1990, inflation in Chile has declined over 25%
down to roughly 3% per year. It has enjoyed successive balanced fiscal budgets and
strong reserves, and it has kept its public debt minimal.
The results of these policies have been positive. The economy has experienced
steady growth, and per capita income continues to increase. In the last twelve years,
the Chilean economy has grown at an average annual rate of 5.9%. Since 1990, its
Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") has increased by roughly 85%. Per capita GDP has
increased by some 65% since 1990. The unemployment rate has not seen large swings
either way over the last several years, although real wages have increased
substantially. Since the early 1990s, real wages in Chile have increased by roughly
46%. The percentage of the population living in poverty continues to decrease. See
also Chile-U.S. Free Trade Agreement Website, available at http://www.chileusafta.
com/ (last visited June 3, 2003) [hereinafter Agreement Website]. From 1987 to 2000,
for example, the percentage of Chileans living in poverty was reduced from 45% to
21%, while the percentage of Chileans living in absolute poverty was also reduced
from 17.4% to 5.7%.
Since 1990, Chile has demonstrated a commitment to democratic institutions and
popular elections. The Chilean legal system is transparent and non-discriminatory,
with an independent and accountable judiciary. There is also minimal corruption in
Chilean institutions compared to other countries in Latin America, and it ranks along
side the United States in the Transparency International Corruption Index. See
Foreign Investment Committee. See also Transparency International, at http://www.
transparency.orgl (last visited June 3, 2003). The Transparency International
Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries according to perceived corruption in
government institutions, with a ranking of number one representing no corruption.
In 2002, Chile ranked 17th out of 102 countries, just one place behind the United
States. It ranked number one among Latin American countries, and number three
among emerging economies.
8. Most recently, in addition to the U.S.-Chile FTA, Chile has just signed
economic agreements with the European Union and South Korea, adding to an
impressive list of trade cooperatives, with more expected in the near future. See
Direcon, supra note 1. Chile is also currently negotiating some ten other trade
agreements, with eight others already signed and awaiting legislative approval. Over
the last thirty years, both the number of different products Chile exports as well as
the number of different countries to which it exports has increased tremendously. See
Foreign Investment Committee, supra note 7. Since 1975, the number of different
products Chile exports has increased from 200 to 3,749, and the number of different
exporters has increased from 200 to 600 in that same time period. From 1975-79,
trade represented 38.6% of Chile's GDP, but from 1991-2001 that number was 42.9%
and continues to grow. By region, Chile exports the most to Europe and imports the
most from Latin America, but its number one individual trading partner is the United
States.
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investment and its policies and laws pertaining to that investment
have been among the most progressive in Latin America.'
For the last thirty years, Chile has maintained an open
investment policy with minimal capital controls."0 It enjoys a low
investment risk rating and is considered the most competitive
market in Latin America.1 Since the mid-1970s, Chile has
received roughly $85 billion in foreign investment. 12 Investment
in Chile, in nominal terms, has been growing at an average
annual rate of almost twenty percent.'" Traditionally, foreign
investment has been concentrated in the mining sector, although
today such investment continues to diversify, finding its way into
other sectors such as fishing, farming, forestry, electricity, natural
gas and water. 4 This diversity of investment has been critical to
Chile's development. The United States has long had the largest
share of foreign investment in Chile."
Chile's acknowledgment of the importance of foreign invest-
ment to its growth and development is evidenced in its foreign
investment laws and treaties. These laws are in line with the
laws pertaining to foreign investment in developed countries in
that the laws encourage the free flow of investment across bor-
ders. Since 1974, the main law regarding foreign investment in
Chile has been Decree Law 600 (D.L. 600).1" D.L. 600 sets up a
standardized system for application and approval of foreign
investment proposals and establishes rights and responsibilities
9. See Foreign Investment Committee, supra note 7.
10. Id.
11. Id. See also Institutional Investor Magazine, available at http://www.
institutionalinvestor.com (last visited June 4, 2003) (ranking Chile as the least risky
Latin American country in which to invest, and the sixth least risky emerging country
in which to invest in 2002); International Institute for Management & Development,
at http://www02.imd.ch/ (last visited June 4, 2003) (ranking Chile as the most
competitive country in Latin America and the third most competitive emerging
economy in 2002).
12. See Foreign Investment Committee, supra note 7. Nearly 90% of the total
foreign investment entering Chile has entered since 1990.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. Over the last thirty years the United States has accounted for over 30% of
total foreign investment in Chile, followed by Spain, which has accounted for slightly
less than 20%.
16. Foreign Investment Statute of 1974, Decree Law 600, Ministerio de Justicia,
Diario Oficial de la Reptiblica de Chile [D.O.] Dec. 16, 1993 [hereinafter D.L. 600].
For good overviews of D.L. 600, see Foreign Investment Committee, supra note 7; The
U.S. Commercial Service, available at http://www.usatrade.gov/website/ccg.nsf/
CCGurl/CCG-CHILE2002-CH-7:-00683BEF (last visited May 1, 2003) [hereinafter
Commercial Service].
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of foreign investors in Chile, with emphasis on principles of non-
discrimination." The law clearly reflects an attitude of openness
to foreign investors, and there are few restrictions on foreign
investment. 8 Another important law regarding foreign invest-
ment in Chile is Chapter XIV of the Central Bank's Foreign
Exchange Regulations, which coincides with the principles set
forth in D.L. 600.11 This law is applicable upon election by a for-
eign investor in lieu of D.L. 600, and it is usually used for short-
term portfolio investments.'
With regard to investment dispute resolution, D.L. 600 pro-
vides for initial review of a dispute by the Foreign Investment
Committee of Chile. 21 Investors also have access to Chilean courts
for further adjudication of an investment dispute.2 However,
Chile has negotiated several Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs),
which, in addition to providing substantive rules regarding for-
eign investment in Chile, also provide investors with the option of
international arbitration for the resolution of investment dis-
putes." BITs are important to the evolution of dispute resolution
in the Americas, as they firmly establish the applicability of inter-
national law to investment dispute resolution.
2 4
The openness of Chile in negotiating BITs separates it from
the traditional Latin American approach regarding the applicabil-
ity of international law to foreign investment. The more tradi-
17. D.L. 600, arts. 9, 10; see also Foreign Investment Committee, supra note 7;
U.S. Commercial Service, supra note 16.
18. One notable restriction is the one-year residency requirement for foreign
capital under Article 4 of D.L. 600, although under that same article profits may be
repatriated at any time. See D.L. 600, at art. 4. Another traditional exception to
Chile's open investment scheme was the encaje, "which required foreign investors to
deposit a variable percentage of foreign-sourced loan funds and portfolio investment
with the Central Bank in a non-interest-bearing account for up to two years." See
Commercial Service, supra note 16. In April 2001, however, this restriction on
investment was eliminated.
19. For a copy of Chapter XIV, see Banco Central, supra note 7.
20. Almost all foreign investment comes into Chile under D.L. 600. See Foreign
Investment Committee, supra note 7. It is important to note that in May 2000, Chile
eliminated the one-year residency requirement for capital entering under Chapter
XIV. See Commercial Service, supra note 16.
21. D.L. 600, art. 10.
22. Id. See also Commercial Service, supra note 16 (noting that investment
disputes in Chile are normally settled through negotiations because of the time it
usually takes to litigate in local courts).
23. As of March of 2003, Chile had negotiated fifty-one BITs, thirty-seven of which
were in force. See Foreign Investment Committee, supra note 7. Chile's most recent
free trade agreements, including those with Canada, Mexico, Korea, the European
Union and the United States, contain investment dispute resolution provisions.
24. See infra note 35.
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tional approach is based on the Calvo Doctrine. 5 In the mid-
nineteenth century, Argentinean diplomat and publicist, Carlos
Calvo, set forth a series of "assertions" that formed the basis of the
doctrine. 6 Calvo argued that international law and principles of
state sovereignty should prohibit diplomatic and military inter-
vention by foreign countries to resolve commercial disputes on
behalf of their investors. 2 According to Calvo, such intervention
exacerbated the inequality between developed and developing
countries by obliging developing countries to accord greater pro-
tection to foreign nationals in commercial dealings than they
accorded to their own citizens."
The Calvo Doctrine, therefore, is based on two key principles:
absolute "nonintervention"29 by foreign states and "absolute equal-
ity of foreigners with nationals"" with regard to foreigners' com-
mercial dealings in another country. Thus, under the Calvo
Doctrine, local law only applies to foreign investment disputes,
and there is little place for international law. The Calvo Doctrine
immediately became popular throughout Latin America.2 For
years, Latin American countries attempted to implement the
Calvo Doctrine through international treaties, in addition to
implementing the Calvo Doctrine in national constitutions,
municipal legislation and contractual stipulation.32 Calvo's princi-
ples are still pervasive in many Latin American countries today
and stand as a point of contention between developed and develop-
ing countries." For example, throughout much of the twentieth
century, Mexico maintained Calvo's principles in its national
laws. 4 The negotiation of NAFTA Chapter 11 resulted in the
25. See generally DONALD R. SHEA, THE CALVO CLAUSE 17 (1955).
26. See id.
27. Id. at 18.
28. Id. at 19.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 19-20.
31. Id. at 21.
32. Id. at 21-32.
33. See Christopher K. Dalrymple, Politics and Foreign Direct Investment: The
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and the Calvo Clause, 29 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 161, 168-69 (1996).
34. See NAFTA Coursebook, supra note 2, at 324 (noting that the Calvo Clause
.stipulate[d] that foreign persons operating in Mexico should be considered in all
respects as Mexicans, thus limiting the resolution of disputes to local courts
adjudicating under domestic law provisions and prohibiting any intervention by the
home government."); Charles N. Brower & Lee A. Steven, Who Then Should Judge?:
Developing the International Rule of Law under NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CH. J. INT'L L.
193-95 (2001) (discussing the history of Mexico's unfriendly foreign investor
provisions and explaining that "the United States lobbied hard to include Chapter
6352004]
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applicability of international law to foreign investment in Mexico.
Chapter 10 of the U.S.-Chile FTA represents another mile-
stone in Chile's commitment to open investment policy. In its sub-
stance, this chapter establishes rights and responsibilities of
foreign investors in line with Chile's traditional open policy. More
importantly, with regard to dispute resolution, Chapter 10 reflects
both countries' commitment to predictable rules and international
law. It solidifies the applicability of international law to foreign
investment disputes, and it does so in a manner that attempts to
bring greater transparency to the international arbitration pro-
cess between private individuals and sovereign entities. An exam-
ination of dispute resolution under Chapter 10 compared to under
NAFTA Chapter 11 sheds light on this development.
CHAPTER 10 OF THE U.S.-CHILE FTA
The structure of Chapter 10 of the U.S.-Chile FTA is similar
to NAFTA Chapter 11. The structure of NAFTA Chapter 11
comes from U.S. BITs that have been in place for years." Of
l1's investment protections precisely because it wanted 'to liberalize Mexican
restrictions on investment'.") (internal footnotes omitted). See Gloria L. Sandrino,
The NAFTA Investment Chapter and Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico: A Third
World Perspective, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 259, 283-87 (1994) for a good discussion
of how the traditional anti-foreign investment sentiment in Mexico is embedded in
the Mexican Constitution and in Mexican law.
Since the NAFTA negotiating process began, however, Mexico has undergone
significant changes in its policy and laws on foreign investment-namely, the Calvo
Clause no longer applies to investors from NAFTA Parties. See Isidro Morales,
NAFTA: The Governance of Economic Openness, 565 ANNALS 35, 50 (1999) (internal
citations omitted), explaining that the traditional Mexican approach:
was completely opposed to the international minimum standard
that the U.S. government has traditionally required all states to
comply with when dealing with foreign investments. According to
the U.S. view, even if a state does not provide its own nationals
with minimum international rights, it may not escape
international responsibility to guarantee minimum standards to
nationals of other countries. Though Latin American countries,
including Mexico, have moved progressively from the national-
centered paradigm to that of the "minimum international
standard" approach, chapter 11 of NAFTA is a turning point in this
regard.
35. Notably, U.S. BITs "commonly dealt with the key issue[ ] of... mechanisms
for settling disputes between foreign investors and host governments," which
included provisions for binding international arbitration. NAFTA Coursebook, supra
note 2, at 324. Currently, there is no multilateral framework for the regulation of
foreign investment, unlike the WTO framework for international trade. See WTO,
Trade and Investment, at http://www.wto.orglenglish/tratop-e/invest~elinvest.e.htm
(last visited Aug. 15, 2003) [hereinafter WTO Investment] ("Despite several efforts
since the end of WWII, to date there does not exist a set of coherent, substantive, and
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course, as discussed, the structure is not something new to Chile
either, as Chile also has in place numerous BITs similar in struc-
ture. 6 Section A of Chapter 10 sets forth substantive provisions
for foreign investment. These provisions stand to promote an
open investment policy between Chile and the United States. Sec-
tion B of Chapter 10 details the investment dispute resolution pro-
cess. It is supplemented by several annexes that further clarify
that process. Although there are many similarities between the
Chapter 10 dispute resolution and the NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute
resolution and although recent developments in NAFTA Chapter
11 dispute resolution render the two dispute resolution
frameworks even more similar, the codification in Chapter 10 of a
few provisions represent what may be labeled as a new step in the
evolution of investor-state dispute resolution.
Substantive Provisions
A main goal of the U.S.-Chile FTA is to "ensure a predictable
commercial framework for business planning and investment," 7
and to "substantially increase investment opportunities in the ter-
ritories of the Parties."3 Foreign investment, of course, has tradi-
binding multilateral rules governing foreign investment."). Absent such a framework,
the United States has signed BITs with more than forty countries, and these
agreements contain standard provisions for dispute resolution in accordance with
established principles of international law. See RONALD A. BRAND, FUNDAMENTALS OF
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 1053-58 (2000) [hereinafter BRAND IBT];
Todd Shenkin, Trade-Related Investment Measures in Bilateral Investment Treaties
and the GATT: Moving Toward a Multilateral Investment Treaty, 55 U. PITT. L. REV.
541 (1994). BITs have thus become a key component of economic integration in
addition to free trade agreements:
The U.S. Model BIT covers five main subjects:
1) general principles for treatment of foreign investors;
2) conditions of expropriation and the measure of compensation
payable;
3) the right to free transfer without delay of profits and other funds
associated with investments;
4) the prohibition of inefficient and trade distorting practices; and
5) access to international arbitration for settlement of investment
disputes.
Notably, the Model BIT provides for binding international arbitration against
signatory states. To view the prototype U.S. Model BIT, see THE U.S. PROTOTYPE
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY at http://www.ita.doc.gov/legal/modelbit.html (last
visited Nov. 22, 2003) (the prototype is from 1994). The U.S. Model BIT, nonetheless,
has served to influence the form and much of the substance of BITs throughout the
world as well as investment provisions in free trade agreements.
36. See Foreign Investment Committee, supra note 7.
37. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, Preamble.
38. Id. art. 1.2(1)(d).
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tionally been one of the most widely debated topics in North/South
relations.39 The overall effects of foreign investment on an econ-
omy, however, especially for developing countries, are generally
positive.40 Both the United States and Chile confirmed the impor-
39. See JOAN E. SPERO & JEFFREY A. HART, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 267-92 (6th ed. 1997) (discussing foreign direct investment
("FDI") in detail and the arguments for and against such investment in developing
countries). In tune with economic liberalism, proponents argue that FDI is a
mechanism for overall economic efficiency, growth and public welfare in developing
countries. Through FDI, foreign companies transfer experience, knowledge,
technology, capital, and create much-needed jobs. Foreign investors stimulate
domestic firms to improve performance by increasing competition in a given market,
and domestic firms further become more competitive in the world economy, thus
enhancing developing countries' external economies. In addition, advocates of FDI
consistently point to the general correlation between increased FDI inflows and
increased trade.
Opponents argue that FDI does not stimulate domestic economic activity; rather,
they say, foreign investors merely repatriate profits instead of reinvesting in host
countries. Moreover, any growth achieved is offset by the high prices developing
countries pay in licensing fees for technology as well as for debt service. Id. Another
argument is that foreign companies absorb and replace domestic capital at best,
rather than provide for new jobs and the spread of technology-that is, FDI is often a
change in ownership, not a change for improvement. Id. Opponents also argue that
intrafirm trading falsely presents positive trade gains for developing countries. Id.
Further, through intrafirm trading, multinational corporations ("MNCs") are able to
manipulate the prices of imports and exports, enabling them to disguise profits in
order to avoid paying taxes in developing countries. Id. Also, MNCs often dominate
markets in developing countries, and these countries in turn rely on technology and
products from MNCs, which discourages local development and allows MNCs to exact
monopoly rents and manipulate research and development (R&D) preferences. Many
are also critical of MNCs' propensity to influence local and national politics in
developing countries when MNCs' profit motives may run inimical to public policy.
40. See SPERO & HART, supra note 39, at 276. The authors offer several facts
about the impact of FDI in light of the various arguments for and against it in
developing countries. FDI generally has more positive effects on developing countries
that invest in human capital development such as education and training. MNCs
tend to raise wages and thus improve the quality of living of employees in developing
countries. Increased FDI inflows are associated with increased trade benefits overall.
However, while technology transfer to developing countries does take place, in some
instances it may be rather limited. Further, some MNCs have demonstrated their
power to influence politics in developing countries, both legally and in some instances
illegally.
Empirical evidence further demonstrates that foreign investment overall and in
particular FDI is beneficial for developing countries, although those countries should
be aware of certain countervailing risks. See Prakash Loungani & Assaf Razin, How
Beneficial is Foreign Direct Investment for Developing Countries?, Finance &
Development 38:2 (2001), available at http://www.imf.org/externalpubs/ft/fandd/
2001/06/loungani.htm (last visited July 3, 2003). The authors point to recent,
comprehensive studies verifying arguments of economic liberals that FDI has a
positive correlation with economic growth in developing countries. Loungani and
Razin also corroborate Spero and Hart's finding that the more a developing country
invests in education and training, the better results it has from FDI and MNC
operations. Further, the authors acknowledge the common criticisms of FDI, but call
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tance of foreign investment to their economies by adopting broad
investor-friendly provisions in Chapter 10. These provisions seek
to stimulate cross-border investment under an open but regulated
framework that is based on international law.
Chapter 10 applies to investors of the Parties and to covered
investments.41 Covered investments include most types of invest-
ments, such as investment in a business, equity securities, debt
securities, options, contract rights, intellectual property rights,
licenses and rights under domestic law, and other types of tangi-
ble or intangible property and rights relating thereto.42 One limi-
tation to the broad definition of investment deals with posting
bonds. The requirement "that a service provider of the other
Party post a bond or other form of financial security as a condition
to providing service into its territory does not of itself make this
Chapter applicable to the provision of that cross-border service.
41
Another important exception is that investment does not include a
judicial or administrative order."
In line with the hallmarks of investment agreements, Chap-
ter 10 sets forth national treatment45 and most-favored nation
treatment46 standards for treatment of investors. Article 10.4
mandates that the Parties accord investors a minimum standard
of treatment in line "with customary international law, including
fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security."47
to attention the lack of empirical evidence to confirm that these effects are
widespread.
41. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.27. An investor is "a Party or state
enterprise thereof, or a national or an enterprise of a Party, that attempts to make, is
making, or has made an investment in the territory of the other Party.".
42. Id.
43. Id. art. 10.1(3). However, Chapter 10 "applies to that Party's treatment of the
posted bond or financial security."
44. Id. art. 10.27. Interestingly, NAFTA Chapter 11 does not specifically mention
this. But see The Lowen Group, Inc. v. United States, 2003 CASE NO./ARB/AF/98/3
(June 26, 2003), available at U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/s/ (last
visited Sept. 29, 2003) [hereinafter State Department Website] (dismissing claimants'
Chapter 11 claims based on judicial proceedings in Mississippi courts).
45. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.2. The Parties are thus obligated to treat
investors and investments from the other Party no less favorable than the Parties
treat investors from their own countries. Also, with respect to individual states in the
United States, the national treatment standard is assessed and applied according to
the treatment that an individual state gives its investors. See arts. 10.2, 10.27.
46. Id. art. 10.3. The Parties are thus obligated to treat investors and investments
from the other Party no less favorable than the Parties treat investors of a non-Party.
47. Id. art. 10.4(1). Annex 10-A of Chapter 10 defines customary international law
as that which "results from a general and consistent practice of States that they
follow from a sense of legal obligation." It is important to note that there is no
automatic cause of action under Chapter 10 if a Party breaches another chapter of the
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More specifically, "'fair and equitable treatment' includes the obli-
gation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adju-
dicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due
process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world
.... "" And, "'full protection and security' requires each Party to
provide the level of police protection required under customary
international law."49 Protection is further extended to investors in
the event of losses resulting from armed conflict or civil strife."0
These provisions clearly reflect the important role of international
law in defining investors' rights under the FTA.
Another important way in which to increase the flow of
investment between countries is to eliminate or significantly
reduce performance requirements. With regard to an investment
from the other Party, Article 10.5 eliminates export quotas,
domestic content requirements, purchase requirements, weight-
ing the volume of exports to foreign exchange inflows, sale restric-
tions, technology transfer requirements and supply
requirements.5 Further, Parties may not "condition the receipt or
continued receipt of an advantage" related to an investment on
domestic content requirements, preferential purchase require-
ments, weighting the volume of exports to foreign exchange
inflows, or sale restrictions.2
There are, however, some notable exceptions to the liberal
performance requirement regime. A Party still may condition the
receipt of an advantage by designating where production facilities
may be located, where services may be provided, where employees
may be trained, where construction may be undertaken and where
research and development may be conducted."3 The restriction on
technology transfer requirements is curtailed "when a Party
authorizes use of an intellectual property right in accordance with
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement." 4 This is also the case "when
U.S.-Chile FTA or a separate international treaty. See art. 10.4(3). Interestingly,
NAFTA Parties issued an interpretation of Chapter 11 in 2001 officially confirming
this principle with regard to NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute resolution. See United
States Trade Representatives, Free Trade Clarifications Related to Chapter 11, at
http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/NAFTA-chapterl1.PDF (last visited
October 28, 2003).
48. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.4(2)(a).
49. Id. art. 10.4(2)(b).
50. Id. art. 10.4(4)-(5).
51. Id. art. 10.5(1).
52. Id. art. 10.5(2).
53. Id. art. 10.5(3)(a).
54. Id. art. 10.5(3)(b)(i). The TRIPS Agreement is the World Trade Organization's
640
2004] US-CHILE FREE TRADE 641
the requirement is imposed . . . to remedy a practice determined
after judicial or administrative process to be anticompetitive
under the Party's competition laws."5
Furthermore, the restrictions on export quotas, domestic con-
tent requirements, technology transfers, and conditioning advan-
tages on domestic content requirements and purchase
requirements "shall not be construed to prevent a Party from
adopting or maintaining measures, including environmental mea-
sures: (i) necessary to secure compliance with laws and regula-
tions that are not inconsistent with this Agreement; (ii) necessary
to protect human, animal or plant life or health; or (iii) related to
the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural
resources."56 The performance requirement regime thus not only
creates an environment for the free flow of investment capital and
ideas, but also provides important exceptions regarding, for exam-
ple, technology transfers and the protection of the environment,
which are important for both countries.
Other important provisions geared toward open investment
deal with management positions and transfers. A Party may not
require an investor's enterprise to appoint individuals of a partic-
ular nationality to senior management positions. 7 Further, trans-
fers from covered investments are "to be made freely and without
delay into and out of' the territory of the Parties. 8 However,
there are exceptions to this open transfer policy, and Chapter 10
(WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. See
WTO, "Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement," at http://www.wto.org
english/thewto-e/whatis_eltif e/agrm7_e.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2003). The
purpose of the TRIPS Agreement is to provide an international framework of
minimum standards of protection for intellectual property. Article 31 of the TRIPS
details the rules governing a situation where a WTO Member permits the use of a
patent in the Member's country without specific authorization from the patent holder
in accordance with the limited exceptions for doing so set forth in Article 30 of the
TRIPS. See TRIPS Agreement, available at http'//www.wto.orgenglish/docs-e/
legalIe/27-trips_04c e.htm#Footref7 (last visited Sept. 29, 2003). The United States
presumably pushed hard to incorporate the TRIPS in the U.S.-Chile FTA because
Chile has not yet assimilated the TRIPS into its domestic law and the United States
wanted to ensure that no matter what happened in Chile the TRIPS would be
applicable to investment under the U.S.-Chile FTA.
55. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.5(3)(b)(ii.).
56. Id. art. 10.5(c)(i)-(iii). For more minor exceptions to the liberal performance
requirement regime, see Articles 10.5(d)-(f).
57. Id. art. 10.6(1). However, a Party "may require that a majority of the board of
directors ... be of a particular nationality, or resident in the territory of the Party,
provided that the requirement does not materially impair the ability of the investor to
exercise control over its investment." Id. art. 10.6(2).
58. Id. art. 10.8(1). Transfers include all types of profits, fees, payments and
proceeds.
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establishes a somewhat complex network of rules and exceptions.
A Party may still, in a non-discriminatory manner, prevent a
transfer in accordance with its laws regarding the protection of
creditors, securities trade, criminal offenses, financial reporting
and compliance with judicial or administrative orders.59 Annex
10-C sets forth special rules for investment disputes involving
payments or transfers to accommodate Chile's requirement that
investment remain in Chile for at least one year.6"
Article 10.9 sets out rules regarding expropriation and com-
pensation in accordance with international norms:
1. Neither Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered
investment either directly or indirectly through mea-
sures equivalent to expropriation or nationalization...
except:
(a) for a public purpose;
(b) in a non-discriminatory manner;
(c) on payment of prompt, adequate, and effective com-
pensation ... 61
Further, in the event of an expropriation, compensation should
not be delayed and must be "equivalent to the fair market value of
the expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation
took place." 2 Article 10.9 does not apply, however, when a Party
grants a compulsory license regarding intellectual property rights
in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement.63 In the same manner,
it also does not apply to the creation, limitation or revocation of
such rights as long as such acts are consistent with Chapter 17 of
the U.S.-Chile FTA."
Annex 10-D emphasizes that the applicable expropriation
standard is that of customary international law, and clarifies the
definition of both direct and indirect expropriation. Direct expro-
priation is defined as when "an investment is nationalized or oth-
erwise directly expropriated through formal transfer of title or
outright seizure."6 The case of indirect expropriation is not as
straight forward, so the annex establishes a fact-based inquiry
59. Id. art. 10.8(5)(a)-(e).
60. Id. Annex 10-C. See generally supra note 18.
61. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.9(1).
62. Id. art. 10.9(2). A Party must also pay an investor interest from the date of
expropriation. Id. art. 10.9(3).
63. Id. art. 10.9(5).
64. Id. Chapter 17 of the U.S.-Chile FTA deals with intellectual property rights.
See U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1.
65. Id. Annex 10-D.
66. Id. Annex 10-D(3).
2004] US-CHILE FREE TRADE 643
test to guide a Chapter 10 tribunal in determining whether such
expropriation has occurred." Lastly, the annex clarifies that
"[elxcept in rare circumstances, nondiscriminatory regulatory
actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legiti-
mate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and
the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriation."68
Another important and interesting substantive provision of
Chapter 10 permits a Party to deny Chapter 10 benefits to an
investor if the investor is owned or controlled by an investor of a
non-Party, and the Party receiving the investment "does not main-
tain diplomatic relations with the non-Party."" Article 10.11 also
establishes other special conditions under which a Party may
deny an investor the benefits of Chapter 10.70 Finally, Article
10.12 indicates that nothing in Chapter 10 shall be interpreted to
contravene measures taken by the Parties to protect the
environment.71
67. Id. Annex 10-D(4)(a):
(a) The determination of whether an action . . . constitutes an
indirect expropriation, requires a case-by-case, fact-based
inquiry that considers, among other factors:
(i) the economic impact of the government action, although
the fact that an action or series of actions by a Party has an
adverse effect on the economic value of an investment,
standing alone, does not establish that an indirect
expropriation has occurred;
(ii) the extent to which the government action interferes with
distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations; and
(ii) the character of the government action.
68. Id. Annex 10-D(4)(b).
69. Id. art. 10.11(1)(a). Both countries believed that this is an important
safeguard in order to protect diplomatic interests. For example, the United States
presumably does not want investors in Cuba to benefit from the U.S.-Chile FTA with
Chile. Also, for example, while Chile does not have a "Cuba," diplomatically speaking
(although Chile only maintains consular relations with Bolivia, it is not like the U.S.-
Cuba situation), it has reason to be concerned about investment inflows related to
illegal drug activity in high drug-producing regions in South America.
70. A Party may deny benefits to an investor if the Party has enacted laws
regarding the non-Party and such laws would be violated if the Party granted the
benefits of Chapter 10 to an investor. Id. at art. 10.11(l)(b). A Party may also deny
benefits to an investor if such investor is owned or controlled by an investor of a non-
Party and that non-Party investor does not do substantial business in the territory of
the Party. Id. at art. 10.11(2)(a). Lastly, a Party may deny benefits to an investor
from a Party if such investor is owned or controlled by an investor of the denying
Party and that investor does not do substantial business in the denying Party. Id. at
art. 10.11(2)(b).
71. Id. art. 10.12.
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Dispute Resolution: A Comparative Look
Predictable rules for the adjudication and enforcement of for-
eign investors' rights is critical to achieving an open investment
regime. Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR") has become the
preferred structure in trade and investment agreements for the
resolution of commercial disputes." The preference for and impor-
tance of international arbitration in modern trade agreements,
72. See BRAND IBT, supra note 35, at 584-85 (detailing the arguments for and
against international arbitration); Noemi Gal-Or, Private Party Direct Access: A
Comparison of the NAFTA and the EU Disciplines, 21 B.C. INTL & COMP. L. REV. 1, 3,
11-12 (1998); Hope H. Camp, Jr., Dispute Resolution and United States-Mexico
Business Transactions, 5 U.S.-MEx. L.J. 85 (1997).
ADR includes methods of resolving disputes without litigation in a particular
court system. For an introductory discussion on ADR, see International Trade
Administration, "A Primer on International Alternative Dispute Resolution," at http://
www.ita.doc.gov/legal/adr.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2003). These methods include
consultation, mediation and arbitration. Mediation, also known as conciliation, is
simply "a process in which parties to a dispute appoint a neutral third party to assist
them in resolving their disputes," and the goal is "a voluntary negotiated settlement."
Arbitration also involves resolution of disputes by a neutral third party, but it is a
more formal step for parties to take. Generally, depending upon the rules to which
the disputing parties have agreed, decisions of arbitration panels can be either
binding or non-binding.
Several organizations offer guidelines and services for international arbitration.
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) is one.
See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), "General
Information," at http://www.uncitral.org/english/commiss/geninfo.htm (last visited
Feb. 23, 2003) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Website]. UNCITRAL is the main legal body
of the United Nations for international trade law. Id. It has set forth several rules
and guidelines regarding international commercial arbitration and conciliation, and,
in particular, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules adopted in 1976 are often selected by
parties to disputes in international arbitration.
The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) was
created by the World Bank in 1966 "to facilitate the settlement of investment disputes
between governments and foreign investors so that investors could help promote
increased flows of international investment." International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes, "About ICSID," at http://www.worldbank.orgicsidabou/main.
htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2003) [hereinafter ICSID Website]. Notably,
ICSID provides facilities for the conciliation and arbitration of
disputes between member countries and investors who qualify as
nationals of other member countries. Recourse to ICSID
conciliation and arbitration is entirely voluntary. However, once
the parties have consented to arbitration under the ICSID
Convention, neither can unilaterally withdraw its consent.
Moreover, all ICSID Contracting States, whether or not parties to
the dispute, are required by the Convention to recognize and
enforce ICSID arbitral awards.
Besides providing facilities for conciliation and arbitration under
the ICSID Convention, the Centre has .. . a set of Additional
Facility Rules authorizing the ICSID Secretariat to administer
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and in particular investment agreements, has been summarized
as follows:
Arbitration has become a fixture in international trade and
investment because it compares favorably to the alterna-
tives. It provides a neutral mechanism characterized by
private proceedings, flexible procedures, expert decision-
makers, relative finality, and enforceability of the result.
For a host state, private adjudication before a learned tri-
bunal within a relaxed procedural framework will often be
preferable to defending against litigation in an investor's
home state.73
Both Chile and the United States have adopted this preference in
Section B of Chapter 10, just as the Parties to NAFTA did in
NAFTA Chapter 11. Chapter 10 explicitly incorporates provisions
for greater transparency in dispute resolution. Although in prac-
tice NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute resolution is more transparent
than what critics argue, by codifying such provisions Chapter 10
represents an important development in investor-state dispute
resolution in the Americas.
Article 10.14: Consultation and Negotiation
Article 10.14 encourages resolution of investment disputes
through less formal means of ADR before an investor chooses
recourse to an international tribunal.74 Consultation, negotiation,
and other "non-binding, third-party procedures" are provided as
first options for investors.75 In this respect, Chapter 10 is exactly
like NAFTA Chapter 11.76 As discussed, the negotiation method is
currently the most common method used by foreign investors in
certain types of proceedings between States and foreign nationals
which fall outside the scope of the Convention.
Provisions on ICSID arbitration are commonly found in investment
contracts between governments of member countries and investors
from other member countries. Advance consents by governments
to submit investment disputes to ICSID arbitration can also be
found in about twenty investment laws and in over 900 bilateral
investment treaties.
73. Clyde C. Pearce & Jack Coe, Jr., Arbitration under NAFTA Chapter Eleven:
Some Pragmatic Reflections upon the First Case Filed Against Mexico, 23 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 311, 318 (2000). See also Gal-Or, supra note 5, at 19
(discussing the obvious advantages of such international arbitration).
74. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.14.
75. Id.
76. See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1118.
2004] 645
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:3
Chile to resolve a dispute with the government.77 Nonetheless,
encouraging less formal means of dispute resolution serves the
interests of both investors and the Parties. Both time and money
may be saved by avoiding recourse to litigation, and more impor-
tantly, there is more flexibility in resolving a dispute in order to
preserve the investment relationship."
Article 10.15: Submission of a Claim to Arbitration
Article 10.15 grants private investors direct access to an
international arbitration panel for the resolution of an investment
dispute.79 An investor may submit a claim on its own behalf or on
behalf of an enterprise owned or controlled by the investor. 0 This
is the structure that is found in NAFTA Chapter 11.81 The claim
may be based on an alleged breach of "an obligation under Section
A or Annex 10-F," "an investment authorization," or "an invest-
ment agreement," if the investor has suffered some loss or damage
as a result of the alleged breach. 2 Annex 10-F details that Chile
must accord an investor from the United States the better treat-
ment of either Chapter 10 or D.L. 600 if the investment entered
Chile under the former.8 3
As mentioned above, D.L. 600 has been the main law regard-
ing foreign investment in Chile since the 1970s.14 Its liberal
investment framework has contributed to Chile's success in
attracting foreign investment, but its dispute resolution frame-
work is different from Chapter 10.85 Annex 10-F, therefore, pro-
vides more specifics regarding the interplay of Chapter 10 and
D.L. 600. If an investment from the United States entered Chile
under a contract based on D.L. 600, the investor may only submit
a claim under Chapter 10 dispute resolution against Chile regard-
77. See generally supra note 22.
78. At the time of this writing, under NAFTA Chapter 11, after almost nine years
since its inception, foreign investors have invoked the Chapter 11 dispute resolution
mechanism against the Parties only eighteen times, eight of which have been against
Mexico. For a listing of the pending arbitrations and accessible documents related
thereto, see the official website for the U.S. Department of State, [hereinafter State
Department Websitel, at http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3439.htm.
79. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.15.
80. Id. art. 10.15(1).
81. See NAFTA, supra note 2, arts. 1116, 1117.
82. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.15(1).
83. Id. Annex 10-F(1). Chile is also required Chile to allow an investor who's
investment entered Chile under D.L. 600 to amend the investment contract to
incorporate the provisions of Chapter 10. Id. at Annex 10-F(2).
84. See generally supra note 16.
85. Id.
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ing the contract if the investor alleges a breach of "Section A in
connection with the investment contract" or Annex 10-F.86 Also,
an investor may not submit a claim under Chapter 10 if an invest-
ment entered Chile under D.L. 600 and the investor alleges that
Chile has breached the tax provisions of the investment contract. s7
In such a case, the investor only has recourse to the dispute reso-
lution provisions in the investment contract or under the dispute
resolution procedures for tax measures in the U.S.-Chile FTA.s'
Furthermore, as long as it does so in accordance with its obliga-
tions under Section A of Chapter 10, Chile may continue to screen
and limit foreign investment entering Chile from the United
States under D.L. 600.89
Other provisions in Article 10.15 serve to detail and limit the
arbitration submission process, and are identical to those found in
NAFTA Chapter 11. Except as permitted for alleged breaches of
Article 12.18 regarding financial services, an investor may only
utilize the Chapter 10 dispute resolution process for alleged
breaches of Section A or Annex 10-F.9° An investor must provide a
Party with written notice of a claim, including the legal and fac-
tual bases and relief sought, at least ninety days before the inves-
tor submits the claim to arbitration.9' Moreover, an investor must
wait at least six months after the events giving rise to a claim
under Chapter 10 occurred before a claim is submitted to arbitra-
tion.92 Further, Annex 10-E grants an investor the opportunity to
choose between the Chapter 10 dispute resolution process and liti-
gating in Chilean courts.93 The purpose of Annex 10-E is to avoid
excess costs and inefficiency associated with parallel litigation
86. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, Annex 10-F(3). The annex further narrows an
investor's claim when D.L. 600 is involved, as an investor "may not submit any claim
under Section B on the basis of the equity/debt ratio requirement of an investment
contract under D.L. 600," unless it is alleged that Chile treated the investor or
investment in a manner less favorable than it treated a similar investor or
investment of a non-Party.
87. Id. Annex 10-F(4).
88. Id.
89. Id. Annex 10-F(6). See generally supra note 16. Just as under the U.S.-Chile
FTA, Chile maintains the right under D.L. 600 to screen investment entering the
country, although the approval rate has traditionally been high.
90. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.15(3). NAFTA Chapter 11 allows certain
claims involving financial services under NAFTA Chapter 14 to be heard by a
Chapter 11 tribunal. See NAFTA, supra note 2, at arts. 1116-1117.
91. U.S.-Chile FTA., supra note 1, art. 10.15(4). This is identical to NAFTA
Chapter 11. See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1119.
92. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.15(5). This is also identical to NAFTA
Chapter 11. See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1120.
93. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, Annex 10-E.
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and to eliminate the possibility that Chile will be twice subject to
liability for the same claim. It is identical to NAFTA Article
112 1. 4 Like under NAFTA Chapter 11, Chapter 10 identifies the
arbitral regimes under which a claim in arbitration may be sub-
mitted.9" As both Parties are members of the ICSID Convention,
an investor may submit a claim under either ICSID or ICSID
Additional Facility Rules.9" Alternatively, an investor may elect to
have a Chapter 10 claim decided under the UNCITRAL rules. 7
Unlike in NAFTA Chapter 11, however, Article 10.15 allows the
parties to elect "any other arbitration rules" to govern the
arbitration.98
The direct access dispute resolution framework is the hall-
mark of modern international investment dispute resolution. It
provides a link between private actors and sovereign entities in
the realm of international law reflecting the commercial relation-
ship between the two in an era of globalization. Here, however, it
is important to mention one aspect of the current debate about
such dispute resolution. A similar framework found in NAFTA
Chapter 11 has been the source of increased debate regarding its
implications for democratic governance and sovereignty.9 Some
critics of NAFTA Chapter 11 argue that, in general, granting pri-
vate investors the right to sue NAFTA Parties directly opens the
Parties up to countless frivolous litigation and thus exacts burden-
some costs on the governments, and ultimately on the citizenry.'
Critics also suggest that subjecting NAFTA Parties to rulings of a
supranational body, such as an international arbitration tribunal,
circumvents domestic legal and political systems and thus is a
threat to sovereignty." 1
It is likely that the Chapter 10 framework will attract the
94. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1121.
95. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10. 15(5); See also NAFTA, supra note 2, art.
1120.
96. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.15(a)-(b); see generally supra note 67; see
also NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1120.
97. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.15(c).
98. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.15(d). This apparently gives investors
more choices in the dispute resolution process. Other provisions in that article
pertain to the interplay between the selected arbitration rules and Chapter 10. Id.
arts. 10.15(6)-(8). Importantly, as with NAFTA Chapter 11, those arbitration rules
apply unless they are modified by the Chapter 10 text. See NAFTA, supra note 2, art.
1131.
99. See generally supra note 6.
100. See Jones, supra note 6; Byrne, supra note 6; Public Citizen, supra note 6.
101. See Price, supra note 6, at 7; Robert K. Paterson, A New Pandora's Box?
Private Remedies for Foreign Investors under the North American Free Trade
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same general criticisms. It may be said, just as is the case with
NAFTA Chapter 11, that these general criticisms are
unfounded. °2 However, the various procedural safeguards found
in the text establish a very controlled dispute resolution regime
that is both efficient and fair to both investors and the Parties.
Moreover, if the expertise and prudence exercised by NAFTA
Chapter 11 arbitration tribunals in analyzing the procedural and
substantive requirements of that chapter is an indication of what
may come under Chapter 10 dispute resolution, there is little
basis to fear frivolous litigation."3 Additionally, it is a hard sell to
proclaim that direct access dispute resolution is detrimental to
both state sovereignty and principles of democratic governance
when it is indeed an act of sovereignty by appropriate branches of
the governments to create such a regime in the first place.'
Article 10.16: Consent of Each Party to Arbitration &
Service of Documents
Article 10.16 officially represents the Parties' consent to the
jurisdiction of an international arbitration panel contemplated in
Chapter 10.1"5 The consent therein is meant to satisfy the consent
requirements of the ICSID Convention,0 6 the New York Conven-
tion, ' 7 and the Inter-American Convention.0 8
Agreement, 8 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & Disp. RESOL. 77, 89 (2000) (discussing the
sovereignty arguments).
102. For a broad discussion of why the major criticisms of NAFTA Chapter 11 are
unfounded, based on the Chapter 11 text as well as a sampling of final Chapter 11
awards, see Jablonski, supra note 6.
103. Id.
104. For a good discussion on the changing notions of sovereignty today, see Ronald
A. Brand, Sovereignty: The State, the Individual, and the International Legal System
in the Twenty First Century, 25 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 279
(2002)[hereinafter Brand, Sovereignty]. Professor Brand notes the growing trends in
international economic law, wherein private parties are increasingly receiving more
rights in the international system. Id. at 290. Moreover, in discussing the historical
origins of sovereignty and the relationship between nation-states and individuals, he
concludes, most correctly, that "[r]ecognition that international law now limits the
conduct of states in their relationships with individuals is not a bad thing, nor does it
necessarily represent a dimunition of the 'sovereignty' of states." Id. at 294.
105. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.16.
106. Id. art. 10.16(2)(a); ICSIID Website, supra note 67.
107. Id. art. 10.16(2)(b). The United Nations Convention on the Enforcement and
Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards, or the New York Convention, 'provides for
the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards rendered in foreign countries."
There are currently 134 countries who are party to the New York Convention. See
UNCITRAL Website, supra note 67.
108. Id. art. 10.16(2)(c). The Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration is like the New York Convention in providing for enforcement
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Article 10.17: Conditions and Limitations on Consent of
Each Party
Article 10.17 establishes a three-year time bar on claims,
beginning the date on which an investor discovered or should have
discovered a breach of Chapter 10 and the resulting loss or dam-
age. 1°9 The time bar provision encourages investors to resolve
investment disputes as they arise, which promotes efficiency in
investments and also prevents both Parties from being subject to
stale claims. Also, in order to use the Chapter 10 dispute resolu-
tion procedure, an investor must waive in writing any right to ini-
tiate suit against the Party in any other court or under any other
dispute resolution procedure."' This provision, however, does not
prevent an investor from seeking some form of injunctive relief
from a domestic court, but only if the purpose of such relief is to
preserve the investor's investment while the arbitration is pend-
ing.111 The waiver provisions thus provide further guarantee that
the Parties will not be subject to duplicate liability, and also
encourage efficiency in the investment dispute resolution process.
The same time bar provisions," 2 waiver provisions"' and
injunctive relief provisions"4 exist under NAFTA Chapter 11.
Under both agreements, a tribunal may issue a protective order to
preserve an investor's right pending the arbitration, but it may
not enjoin the governmental measure under dispute."' In both
treaties, these provisions protect parties from excess liability and
encourage efficiency of investments.
Article 10.18: Selection of Arbitrators
Article 10.18 provides that an arbitral tribunal will consist of
three arbitrators: each disputing party selects one arbitrator and
both disputing parties together select the third."6 If the parties
cannot agree on whom to appoint as the third arbitrator within
of foreign arbitral awards. For a copy of the text of the Inter-American Convention,
see the website of the Organization of American States, at http://www.oas.org/
juridico/englishltreatieslb-35.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2003). There are nineteen
signatories to the Inter-American Convention.
109. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.17(1).
110. Id. art. 10.17(2).
111. Id. art. 10.17(3).
112. NAFTA, supra note 2, arts. 1116(2), 1117(2).
113. Id. art. 1121(1)-(3).
114. Id. art. 1121(1)(b), (2)(b).
115. See id. art. 1134; U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.19(8).
116. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.18(1).
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seventy-five days from the date the claim was submitted, the Sec-
retary-General has the authority to appoint the arbitrator in order
to commence the arbitration."7 Here, there is no difference from
NAFTA Chapter 11.118
Article 10.19: Conduct of Arbitration
Article 10.19 does reflect some of the provisions in NAFTA
Chapter 11 regarding the conduct of Chapter 10 arbitrations. Dis-
puting parties may choose where a Chapter 10 arbitration will
take place, with the condition that the arbitration must take place
in a country that is a party to the New York Convention for
enforcement purposes.119 A non-disputing Party can make sub-
missions regarding its interpretation of Chapter 10, both written
and oral, during the course of an arbitration.2 0 Moreover, a tribu-
nal has the power to order an interim order of protection to pre-
serve an investor's rights and/or the competence of the tribunal
until a final award is issued, but it may not enjoin the challenged
governmental measure."'
Article 10.19 establishes a dispute resolution framework that
is explicitly inclusive and open. The tribunal in a Chapter 10 arbi-
tration may "accept and consider amicus curiae submissions from
a person or entity that is not a disputing party . ... "122 The
NAFTA Free Trade Commission recently issued a clarification
statement of NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute resolution, explaining
that nothing in NAFTA precludes a Chapter 11 tribunal from
accepting amicus curiae submissions.'23 In this respect, the two
dispute resolution frameworks are similar. The Chapter 10 text,
moreover, signifies an explicit movement away from the tradition-
ally more closed process of international investment dispute reso-
117. Id. art. 10.18(2)-(3).
118. See NAFTA, supra note 2, arts. 1123-1125.
119. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.19(1); see NAFTA, supra note 2, at art.
1130.
120. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.19(2); see NAFTA, supra note 2, at art.
1128-29.
121. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.19(8); see NAFTA, supra note 2, at art.
1134.
122. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.19(3).
123. See Unofficial Statement of the Free Trade Commission on non-disputing party
participation, Oct. 7, 2003, available at http//:www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/
nafta2003/statement-nondisputingparties.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2003). In United
Parcel Service of America v. Canada, (U.S. v. Can.), available at http://www.state.govl
s/lc3749.htm, for example, the Chapter 11 tribunal accepted written briefs by non-
disputing parties.
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lution and toward public participation in the disputes."
Article 10.19 also provides ample opportunity for a disputing
Party to raise an objection to the tribunal's competence with
respect to an investor's claim.12" ' The tribunal must suspend pro-
ceedings on the merits and address the objection."' This practice
is common under NAFTA Chapter 11, however, there are no provi-
sions explicitly providing for such in the NAFTA text.' Moreo-
ver, as per the request of a disputing Party, the tribunal must
send a copy of its proposed final award to the disputing parties
and the non-disputing Party for comments, which the tribunal
may consider for purposes of modifying its award.'28
Most interestingly, Article 10.19 keeps open the possibility for
"a separate multilateral agreement ... that establishes an appel-
late body for purposes of reviewing awards rendered by tribunals
.... "129 The idea of establishing an appellate body for NAFTA
Chapter 11 arbitrations has been offered more than once in the
literature on NAFTA.'2 ' Pending trade promotion authority legis-
124. The idea of confidentiality in NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes has given rise to
ample criticism of Chapter 11 dispute resolution. One commentator contests the
principle of confidentiality in international arbitrations entirely, and vehemently
opposed the confidentiality of NAFTA dispute settlement on grounds that investors
must assume that documents will be made public for purposes of accountability to
democratic governments. See Fracassi, supra note 6. Others remark that principles
of confidentiality serve legitimate purposes in international investment arbitration.
See Daniel R. Loritz, Corporate Predators Attack Environmental Regulations: It's
Time to Arbitrate Claims Filed Under NAFTA's Chapter 11, 22 Loy. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 533, 539 (2000) (commenting that the confidential nature of the
arbitrations serves as an incentive for both parties to submit important documents
regarding the investment dispute that would not come out in open court).
125. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.19(4).
126. Id. However, a disputing Party may not object to the jurisdiction of a Chapter
10 tribunal on grounds that the investor in the dispute may be entitled to
indemnification or reimbursement for the alleged loss under an insurance contract.
Id. art. 10.19(7).
127. In many NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitrations, a disputing NAFTA Party has
objected to the jurisdiction of the tribunal and the tribunal holds proceedings to
decide whether it should hear a claim on its merits. See State Department Website,
supra note 43.
128. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.19(9).
129. See id. art. 10.19(10).
130. See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbot, The Political Economy of NAFTA Chapter
Eleven: Equality Before the Law and the Boundaries of North American Integration,
23 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 303, 308 (2002). Abbot questions whether
democratic NAFTA Parties and their citizens should be "comfortable" with arbitral
decisions given that there is no appellate review process, and he suggests that
NAFTA Parties establish an appellate body or provide national courts with more of a
role in Chapter 11 arbitrations. However, one argument for not including an
appellate mechanism is that in striking the balance between the need for economic
efficiency and legal certainty, NAFTA Parties chose to side with finality over
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lation in the U.S. Congress calls for the establishment of an appel-
late review mechanism to review decisions rendered by
international arbitration panels in investor-state disputes arising
out of trade/investment agreements.13'
The main purpose of the appeal mechanism is to establish
another safeguard against subjecting Parties to the liability of an
international arbitration tribunal, in addition to that which is
already provided in Article 10.25(6) which allows a Party to peti-
tion a domestic court for review of questions of law in a final
award.'3 2 Annex 10-H establishes a three-year time frame for the
Parties to consider and possibly establish an appellate review
mechanism.133 Overall, the establishment of an appellate mecha-
nism would create an even more open arbitration process with
more checks on international arbitration panels. This would
seemingly appease those critics who view direct access dispute
resolution without a review process as an affront to principles of
democracy.
Article 10.20: Transparency of Arbitral Proceedings
Article 10.20 goes a step further than Article 10.19 in order to
establish a more open investor-state dispute resolution process.
First, a disputing Party must promptly make available to the non-
disputing Party all documents pertaining to a Chapter 10 arbitra-
tion as they are received."3 Even more, a Chapter 10 tribunal
appellate litigation. One economic rationale behind this is to deal with an investment
dispute in a neutral forum when it arises and move on, which lessens the likelihood of
pending litigation inhibiting decisions to invest. Also, in the context of appellate
review and NAFTA, commentators have opined that:
heightened judicial review... constitutes an independent violation
of Chapter 11. Although heightened review might not, for technical
and political reasons, subject the NAFTA Parties to additional
claims for liability, it undermines the principle of voluntary
compliance with authoritative decisions rendered at the
international level by impartial bodies charged with the
supervision of treaty compliance. Thus, heightened judicial review
impairs the development of the rule of law in international
economic relations.
See Brower II, supra note 5, at 47.
131. See CRS Report to Congress, Trade Promotion (Fast-Track) Authority:
Summary and Analysis of Selected Major Provisions of H.R. 3005, April 15, 2002,
available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/10090.pdf (last visited Nov.
22, 2003) [hereinafter TPA].
132. NAFTA Chapter 11 allows for the same process of review with regard to
questions of law. See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1136.
133. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, Annex 10-H.
134. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.20(1).
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"shall conduct hearings open to the public... .,111 This is a signifi-
cant development in investor-state dispute resolution and repre-
sents a major departure from procedures in such dispute
resolution that leaned toward confidentiality. Article 10.20 does,
however, provide several provisions for protecting confidential
business information and national security information during the
course of such "public" proceedings.131
One of the major criticisms of NAFTA Chapter 11 has been
that the investor-state dispute resolution process is "secret" and
evades public scrutiny.' Some have suggested that NAFTA
Chapter 11 arbitrations be made more open to public participa-
tion.1 3s The United States recently issued a statement concerning
the openness of NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitrations, confirming its
support for open hearings through mediums such as "closed-cir-
cuit television systems, Internet webcasting, or other forms of
access.""1 9 In negotiating the Chapter 10 dispute resolution frame-
work, the Parties took careful consideration of these criticisms
and have without a doubt established an explicitly more transpar-
ent framework of investor-state dispute resolution. Given this
development, the Chapter 10 process may avoid some of the
intense criticism that NAFTA Chapter 11 has endured regarding
its compatibility with principles of openness and democracy.
Article 10.21: Governing Law
Article 10.21 provides that disputes under Chapter 10 arbi-
trations shall be governed by international law. 40 When the rules
governing an investment contract are not specified in the contract,
the arbitration tribunal in a Chapter 10 dispute must apply the
law of the disputing Party, the terms of the contract, applicable
international law and the provisions of the U.S.-Chile FTA."4'
135. Id. art. 10.20(2).
136. Id. art. 10.20(3)-(4).
137. See, e.g., Fracassi, supra note 6.
138. See Jones, supra note 6.
139. Statement (U.S.) on Open Hearings in NAFTA Chapter Eleven Arbitrations,
Oct. 7, 2003, available at http/:www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/nafta2003!
statement-nondisputingparties.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2003). For example, the
parties decided to hold the arbitration open to the public via closed circuit television
in United Parcel Service of America v. Canada, (U.S. v. Can.), available at http:/
www.state.gov/s/lJc3749.htm. See ICSID Website, supra note 72, at http://www.
worldbank.orglicsid/ups.htm.
Current trade promotion authority legislation also calls for public access to
investor-state arbitrations. See TPA, supra note 131.
140. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.21(1).
141. Id. art. 10.21(2).
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Further, the Parties have the authority to issue interpretations of
the provisions of Chapter 10, which are binding on Chapter 10
tribunals.142 The same regime is established under NAFTA Chap-
ter 11, although with less detail." This structure gives proper
place to international law as well as respects the authority of the
Parties in interpreting and implementing the U.S.-Chile FTA.
Article 10.22: Interpretation of Annexes
Article 10.22 provides another avenue through which the Par-
ties' interpretation of the U.S.-Chile FTA has binding effect on a
Chapter 10 tribunal. If a disputing Party claims as a defense that
the challenged governmental measure or action is within the
exceptions listed in Annex I or Annex II, that Party may request
an official, binding interpretation of the issue by the Commis-
sion.'44 The same setup exists in NAFTA Chapter 11 for similarly
reserved defenses. 14
Article 10.23: Expert Reports
Article 10.23 allows for participation of experts.'46 Experts
may be called upon by a disputing party, or by the tribunal if the
disputing parties agree to submit written reports during the arbi-
tration process on complex scientific issues pertaining to environ-
mental, health or safety matters.' 4' These provisions are identical
to those found in NAFTA Chapter 11.141
142. Id. art. 10.21(3). Interpretations are issued by the Free Trade Commission,
which is established under Article 21.1 of the U.S.-Chile FTA.
143. See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1131. Under Chapter 11, international law is
the applicable law, and the interpretations of the Parties through the Free Trade
Commission regarding the text are binding on a Chapter 11 tribunal. For example, in
2001 the Trade Commission issued a statement on Chapter 11 dispute resolution
clarifying certain rules regarding confidentiality and the applicability of international
law, which is binding on all Chapter 11 tribunals. See generally supra note 46.
The U.S.-Chile FTA goes further than NAFTA in stating the applicable rules that
apply when an investment contract lacks such terms, for further clarification.
144. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.22. Annexes I and II set out a series of
country-specific reservations for non-conforming measures pertaining to certain areas
of services and investment. The U.S. and Chilean reservations and exceptions to non-
discriminatory treatment of foreign services and investment cover a wide range of
areas including atomic energy, radio communications, air transportation, trademark
services, customs services and mining, to name a few sectors.
145. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1132.
146. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.23.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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Article 10.24: Consolidation
Article 10.24 provides a detailed process through which a dis-
puting party may request a consolidation of more than one pend-
ing arbitrations where those arbitrations "have a question of law
or fact in common and arise out of the same events or circum-
stances." 4 9 This process is very similar to that which is found in
NAFTA Chapter 11.1"0
Article 10.25: Awards
The rules regarding awards and the enforceability thereof in
Article 10.25 are identical to those found in NAFTA Chapter 11."'
In the event of a breach of Chapter 10, a Chapter 10 tribunal may
award an investor monetary damages plus interest to make the
investor whole.152 A tribunal may also award costs and attorneys
fees to the winning party.15 3 Further, Chapter 10 does not allow
for punitive damages.'
With regard to enforcement, a Chapter 10 award is only
enforceable between the disputing parties in the particular case. 55
Disputing parties are charged with complying with a Chapter 10
award "without delay."5 6 In the case of an award issued under
ICSID rules, a disputing party may not request final enforcement
until 120 days have passed and there has been no request for
review or such a review has been completed. 57 In the case of an
award issued under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules or under
UNCITRAL Rules, a disputing party must wait 90 days under the
same conditions or until "a court has dismissed or allowed an
application to revise, set aside, or annul the award and there is no
further appeal."'5
Parties must enforce Chapter 10 awards in their own territo-
ries.'59 If a Party fails to do so, the Party of the investor who
149. Id. art. 10.24.
150. See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1126.
151. Id. arts. 1135-1136.
152. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.25 (1).
153. Id. If a claim is brought on behalf of an enterprise, the tribunal must make
the award in the name of the enterprise, but must also state that such award is made
"without prejudice to any right that any person may have in the relief under
applicable domestic law." Id. art. 10.25(2).
154. Id. art. 10.25(3).
155. Id. art. 10.25(4).
156. Id. art. 10.25(5).
157. Id. art. 10.25(6)(a).
158. Id. art. 10.25(6)(b).
159. Id. art. 10.25(7).
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obtained judgment may request that an arbitration panel be
established to determine if the disputing Party is in contravention
of its obligations under the U.S.-Chile FTA along with a recom-
mendation that the Party comply with the Chapter 10 award."6
Even if such a panel has been convened, however, an investor may
request enforcement of the final award under the ICSID Rules,
the New York Convention or the Inter-American Convention."'
Article 10.26: Service of Documents
Article 10.26 establishes the basic rule for serving a Party
with documents relating to the arbitral process, which is custom-
ary in such agreements for effecting proper notice to a Party
regarding a dispute."2 Here, therefore, just as with NAFTA Chap-
ter 11, the Parties are bound to accept documents in the interna-
tional arbitration process for investment disputes under Chapter
10.163
Summary of Developments: A Progressive Step
As discussed, the U.S.-Chile FTA Chapter 10 framework is
modeled after and reflects the principles and purposes of NAFTA
Chapter 11. As also discussed, however, Chapter 10 dispute reso-
lution differs from NAFTA Chapter 11 in a few important ways.
In summary, the important developments in investor-state dis-
pute resolution are found in Articles 10.19 and 10.20." Indeed,
the NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute resolution in practice already
makes available some of these developments. However, although
practice and recent clarifications by the NAFTA Free Trade Com-
mission NAFTA evidence that Chapter 11 dispute resolution is
more transparent than critics have argued, Chapter 10 of the
U.S.-Chile goes a step further by codifying a more participatory
dispute resolution framework.
Article 10.19 sets forth explicit guidelines for handling juris-
dictional objections before a tribunal reaches the merits of a dis-
pute. Moreover, a Chapter 10 tribunal has the discretion to
160. Id. art. 10.25(8). Under 10.25(8), if a Party does not comply with an award, a
non-disputing Party may seek the establishment of a arbitral panel under Article 22.6
to decide whether "failure to abide by or comply with the final award is inconsistent
with the obligations" of the U.S.-Chile PTA and potentially receive a recommendation
for compliance.
161. Id. art. 10.25(9). See generally supra notes 67, 102, 103.
162. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.26.
163. See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1122.
164. See generally supra notes 114-30.
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"accept and consider" briefs from non-disputing parties under
Article 10.20, and if requested must send copies of a proposed
award to disputing parties and the investor's home country for
comments before rendering the final award under Article 10.25.
While Chapter 10 does not establish an official mechanism for
appellate review of Chapter 10 awards, the text does allow for the
inclusion of such a mechanism in the dispute resolution process if
created in the future.
Article 10.20 provides explicit guidelines for document shar-
ing in the course of investor-state dispute resolution, and most
significantly requires Chapter 10 arbitration proceedings to be
open to the public. In addition, and as a general but important
note, Chile and the United States have included more definitions
in the Annexes of Chapter 10 in an attempt to clarify several con-
cepts as used in the text, including international law."'5 This
clearly is an effort to provide Chapter 10 tribunals with more gui-
dance in deciding both jurisdictional objections as well as merit-
based arguments and to limit ambiguities arising from the text,
and to further limit tribunals' discretion. It may be stated, there-
fore, that given the debate on NAFTA Chapter 11 over the last
several years, in negotiating Chapter 10 both Chile and the
United States included provisions therein that attempt to estab-
lish a more inclusive, transparent investor-state dispute resolu-
tion process. Although these changes will probably not appease
the staunchest opponents of NAFTA Chapter 11, they will serve to
incorporate opinions and checks on the Chapter 10 dispute resolu-
tion process.
CONCLUSION: FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION
HAS A PLACE
The promotion of foreign investment alongside trade is criti-
cal to a country's economic viability, especially with respect to
developing countries. Creating predictable rules and dispute reso-
lution procedures in accordance with principles of international
law is critical to promoting the free flow of such investment.
Chapter 10 of the U.S.-Chile FTA incorporates these concepts into
its text by establishing a well-defined investor-state dispute reso-
lution framework that reflects the realities of the global political
economy-that reflects the interaction between private actors and
nation-states in an era of globalization. The Chapter 10 dispute
165. See U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 1, Annexes 10-A and 10-D.
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resolution framework represents an important step for both Chile
and the United States in officially linking the applicability of
international law to foreign investment in the Americas.
The degree of criticism that Chapter 10 dispute resolution
will receive, of course, remains to be seen, but it will probably be
less than that which NAFTA Chapter 11 has endured. Regard-
less, given the numerous similarities to NAFTA Chapter 11 and
the clarifications regarding openness and inclusiveness in Chap-
ter 10, Chapter 10 dispute resolution represents an important
milestone for investor-state dispute resolution in the Americas. It
is evidence that direct access investment dispute resolution based
on principles of international law does have a place in free trade
agreements in the Americas.
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